



第四屆國際漢學會議 論文集

近代中國的政治與外交

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中央研究院

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開幕致詞

大會主席 余英時院士

中央研究院第一次召開國際漢學會議是在一九八〇年，原本希望以後每十年召開一次。今年是第四屆，但距第三屆已十二年，算是遲了兩年。

事實上，早在一九五九年已有人提議本院應該召開漢學會議。當時的院長是胡適之先生，他認為台灣的漢學研究無論在質還是在量的方面都還沒有達到他所期待的水平，因此力主緩議。這一提議卻引起了他對於所謂「漢學中心」的記憶和感慨。他說：

二十年前在北平和沈兼士、陳援菴兩位談起將來漢學中心的地方，究竟是在中國的北平，還是在日本的京都，還是在法國的巴黎？現在法國的伯希和等老輩都去世了，而日本一班漢學家現在連唐、宋沒有標點的文章，往往句讀也被他們讀破了。所以希望漢學中心現在是在台灣，將來仍在大陸。

但六十三年後的今天，我們對於胡先生的「漢學中心」說已有完全不同的理解。試一回顧過去五、六十年間漢學的發展，我們可以得到以下兩點認識：

第一，漢學已加速度地擴散到一切專門學科之中，不但人文和社會科學的每一部門中都包涵著越來越多的漢學研究，而且在中國科技史的廣大領域中，自然科學的各部門也和漢學日益緊密地結合在一起了。於是出現了一個奇詭的景象：漢學一望無際，觸處皆是，但是漢學作為一個專門學科 (academic discipline) 卻並不獨立存在，因為漢學研究基本是寄托在其他學科之中的，如語言、文學、歷史、哲學、藝術、宗教之類。

第二，二戰以後各國漢學研究都取得了重要的成就，可是「漢學中心」卻未在任何地方出現。不用說，漢學研究在各國活躍的情形頗不一致，但即使是最活躍的國家也未曾取得公認的「中心」地位。事實上，如果我們分別考察各國漢學研究的大體趨向，便不難發現：主要由於研究的傳統和關注的問題彼此不同，每一地區的漢學都或多或少地展現出一種獨特的歷史和文化風貌。世界文化是多元的，漢學研究的傳統也不能不是多元的，這是我們今天共同承認的基本事實。

基於以上兩點新認識，我們可以十分肯定地說，胡適和他的朋友們當年最所繫心的「漢學中心」何在的問題，今天已自然而然地消逝了。如果有人堅持要在這個問題上討一個明確的答案，我祇好說：漢學猶如十六世紀布魯諾（Giordano Bruno）構想中的宇宙，其中心無所不在，其邊緣則無所在（“Its center is everywhere, its periphery nowhere.”）。

自本院一九八〇年召開第一次會議起，我個人每一屆都會參與準備工作。因此我可以很負責地說，我們的唯一目的便是給世界各地漢學研究者提供一個充分交流的學術平台，所謂「漢學中心」問題從來不在我們的考慮之內。我們承認並且尊重每一地區漢學傳統的獨特風格，但是我卻不願看到任何漢學研究社群走上自我封閉的道路。因此不同傳統之間的互相溝通、互相認識和互相影響是極其必要的。我們相信，過去本院主持的三次會議多少曾發揮了這樣的功能。我們希望本屆會議也能作出同樣的貢獻。

我以最誠摯的心情感謝各地漢學同道們前來參加會議，特別是遠道冒暑而至的朋友們。我預祝大家有一次成功而愉快的學術聚會。

我個人因事不能到會，謹致最深的歉意！

二〇一二年六月二十日

序

中央研究院副院長 王汎森

中央研究院在1980年舉辦了第一屆國際漢學會議，其後以約10年的間隔舉辦一屆，至今已至第四屆。2010年初我奉翁啓惠院長的任命，擔任副院長一職，當時思考著幾件應該進行的大事，其中之一就是漢學會議。在翁院長的大力支持下，第四屆國際漢學會議順利召開，上距第三屆已有12年，而距離第一屆更超過30年。30多年來，與會的學者在改變，討論和關注的議題也隨著時空的推移，不斷的變遷。

當代社會資訊發達，空間距離縮小，連帶促進了地球村的形成，在這樣的時代背景下，使得「漢學」已不再是專屬華人的學問，而儼然成為國際性的議題。學者關心的議題，也不再限於一時一地，而更多跨領域甚至跨國界的觀照。

從這一屆所發表的論文觀察，我感到較諸以往有幾點不同。在這裡僅以史學為例，從「主題」、「材料」與「工具」三方面略作討論。

首先是「主題」的擴展，以歷史研究為例，早已跨出傳統「帝王家譜」的框架，進而更多關注基層社會的歷史，關心人民的生活。討論的議題幾乎可說已經沒有局限而充分展現多元。

從「史料」方面講，傅斯年所揭示的「上窮碧落下黃泉，動手動腳找材料」的精神，繼續得到重視與發揚。尤其近年來大量新材料的出土，大幅改變了我們對問題的看法和認識。這裏所說的新材料，不只限於考古出土的史料，還應該包括過去被列為禁燬或長期處於邊緣的史料，這些以往不能看或不易看到的東西，經過大量的刊印後，如今都觸手可及，無異於「新出土」，提供給學者們一個研究的新寶庫。此外，許多數位化資料庫

的建立，使得過去數十年皓首窮經都做不到的事情，現在也許一個按鍵彈指間就可獲得，為學者帶來無窮的「近用性」。當然，我也必須強調，「檢索」不能代替閱讀。

從「工具」而言，科技帶來許多研究的新工具，數位工具的興起，使研究者與材料之間的關係得到全面的改變。另外如 GIS 的應用，方便我們用空間來思考事情，也使得研究的面向從單點連結到多點、甚至擴展為全面。這些新工具的產生及應用，是過去幾屆漢學會議所無法想像的事。當然，以現代科技的日新月異，我們可以想像到第五屆時必然會有更新的工具出現，其新異的程度也可能是我們現在無法想像的。

第四屆漢學會議的成功召開，首先要感謝翁啓惠院長的全力支持，余英時院士慨允擔任大會主席，黃進興院士和黃樹民院士力任艱巨。世界各地學者的熱烈響應，更是我們必須表示敬意與謝意的。

在會議召開一年後，全帙 22 冊的會議論文集得以出版，這要歸功於出版委員會的不懈努力以及李宗焜博士、葉光輝博士與各冊主編和學者專家的配合。不論會議期間或出版過程，還有無數的助理同仁都付出了大量的心力。在全書即將付梓之際，我謹代表中央研究院對他們的貢獻表示衷心的感謝。

序

大會祕書處

二〇一〇年四月，翁啓惠院長由於關切人文社會科學的發展，特別指示，籌辦「第四屆國際漢學會議」。歷史語言研究所會同民族學研究所、近代史研究所、中國文哲研究所、臺灣史研究所、語言學研究所、人文社會科學研究中心等七個研究單位，共同配合辦理。經過整整兩年的努力，遂於二〇一二年六月二十日至二十二日如期召開大會。各國應邀發表論文的學者共計有二九二位，主持與評論者計四十三人，全體與會人員更達一千六百之眾，堪稱學術界的一大盛事。

本次會議具有四大特色：首先，進行深度討論，會議論文發表者，兼做主持人與評論，角色彼此替換；其二，跨學科、跨領域、跨地區的探討；其三，新領域與新議題的開發與探索；最後，迥異於往昔只有資深學人參加，此次廣邀富有潛力的年輕學者與會，副教授以下達總人數四分之一以上。

會議期間，雖值颱風侵襲，與會人員一本初衷，風雨無阻，踴躍出席，討論熱烈，成果甚為豐碩。會後，復承王汎森副院長交待，成立編輯委員會，審議提交論文，俾便結集成冊。茲將最後定稿梓行，以供學界分享，並就教於諸方大家。

最後，本會議論文集得以刊行，必須感謝各分冊主編，尤其是出版委員會的編輯祕書李宗焜教授。

謹列本屆國際漢學會議攸關工作人員如下，並致謝忱：

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導 言

潘光哲*

一、小 引

從宏觀的角度言之，在臺灣的歷史學領域裡，研究十九、二十世紀的近代中國史的專業，得以做為一門學科，佔有一席之地，歷程之曲折，較諸近代中國的多重變遷樣態，實在不遑多讓。他者毋言，最初中央研究院籌辦漢學會議之際，就有學術前輩認為在「漢學」的學術空間裡，不包括近代中國史的研究。¹當然，歷史證明了這樣的反對意見，並沒有成為事實。

歷經三十年春秋，此際研究近代中國的史學從業者，毋庸「爭取」自己在學術體制裡做為學科的「正當性」；相對的，現在的問題與挑戰，反而來自於以研究中國近代史為專業的史學社群內部。特別是與整體大環境的激盪相呼應，隨著史學視野的擴張與調整，文化史的研究取向，在臺灣的史學領域，蔚然成風，標誌著一股新興的氣象；²影響所及，本來在近代中國史的領域裡曾經蔚為「大國」的政治外交史研究，竟爾

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1 呂實強，《如歌的行板——回顧平生八十年》（臺北：中央研究院近代史研究所，2007），頁338-339。

2 這是王晴佳的觀察，參見：王晴佳，《臺灣史學五十年（1950-2000）：傳承、方法、趨向》（臺北：麥田出版，2002），頁209。

好似「日薄西山」；好比說，史界新秀研究「國民革命軍」，論證其間發展歷史裡積蘊馴化而成的「男性氣概」，³ 固是令人驚豔；卻也不免感慨繫之，新興的認知概念，與具體軍／政權力鬥爭之競逐的議題，如何相互結合，別顯歷史圖像的新貌，自然猶是征塵漫漫。⁴

畢竟，歷經多重思想／認識的轉折，「近代中國」這個概念範疇，絕對不會是不證自明的。所謂「近代」，所謂「中國」，都必須被質疑，被反省，被思考。過往近代中國史的研究成果，也處於相同的情境。特別是政治外交領域裡，許多被視為近代史研究之重大課題者，可能是由於史學工作者的「事後之明」，因此才被認為是「重大課題」的；對於近代政治外交發展歷史的解釋觀點，也總難免受限於使它孕育出世具體的時空環境，甚或打上了現實的烙印，有待修正突破。如何轉換視野，挑戰既有課題之通說；抑或不受既有知識成見之拘束，別開通衢新境，在在都是對當代史家技藝的考驗。例如，黃宇和對於孫中山生命與思想史的重建，⁵ 茅海建對於「戊戌變法」與向被認為其間核心人物康有為之研究，⁶ 唐啟華探索描摹民國時期北京政府的外交歷史，⁷ 黃自進清理

蔣介石與日本之淵源交涉的成果，⁸ 都顯示了政治外交領域的研究空間，還是無限廣袤。況且，近代中國的歷史變遷，錯綜複雜，政治與外交領域更是倏忽轉易，風雲詭譎。既有的歷史敘述，即便可以讓我們大致掌握筋脈軌跡，箇中繁雜曲折的歷史場面，卻總有待探幽覓隱的空間。本書做為中央研究院主辦第四屆漢學會議的成果之一，付梓問世，既展現近代中國政治外交史的最新成果，也充分揭示這個領域的研究事業，其實依復大有可為。

二、

人是天生的政治動物，總離不開群居共處的生活；生活世界裡的政治外交風潮，往往也震動一時，激撼人心。然而，不論是內政經略抑或是外交折衝，常常既是理想與現實之間的衝突矛盾，難免更是力量和利益的競逐交換。回瞻近代中國政治與外交的歷史，萬相斑斕，但若掙脫不了特定意識形態的束縛，僅止以簡單的模式或概念進行概括，恐怕只會使這幅歷史圖像，從多彩繽紛變成了黑白兩判。因此，研治近代中國政治與外交的歷史，應該供應生產的歷史知識，不是具有道德訓誨意義的「歷史智慧」，而必須是盡可能逼近歷史本身的實相。本書集結的論文，各篇作者江夏由樹、吳翎君、松浦正孝、許文堂、陳紅民、陳慈玉、黃自進等（依姓名筆劃序），俱為當前學界的中堅學者。他們就其專精

3 王詩穎，《國民革命軍與近代中國男性氣概的形塑（1924-1945）》（臺北：國史館，2011）。

4 即如 Susan Padersen 表示，導入「男性氣概」以解釋英國自由黨在十九世紀長期執政的原因，絕非引入文化史取向以開展政治史研究之「新政治史」的「創新」（newness），既存高層政治（high political）歷史與「新政治史」之研究取向，即便思想傳承不同，方法論信念（乃至政治立場）有所歧異，如何尋覓共同基礎，仍有益於吾人對歷史的認識，見：Susan Padersen, "What is Political History Now?" in David Cannadine, edited, *What is History Now?* (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 40-45.（當然，她對相關的研究取向，也指出問題所在，不贅。）

5 黃宇和，《孫逸仙在倫敦，1896-1897：三民主義思想探源》（臺北：聯經出版事業公司，2007）、黃宇和，《三十歲前的孫中山——翠亨、檀島、香港 1866-1895》（香港：中華書局，2011）。

6 茅海建，《戊戌變法史事考》（北京：生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，2005；修訂本易名為：茅海建，《戊戌變法史事考初集》〔北京：生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，2012〕）、茅海建，《戊戌變法史事考二集》（北京：生活·讀書·

新知三聯書店，2011）、茅海建，《從甲午到戊戌：康有為《我史》箋注》（北京：生活·讀書·新知三聯書店，2009）。

7 唐啟華，《被「廢除不平等條約」遮蔽的北洋修約史（1912-1928）》（北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2010）。

8 黃自進，《蔣介石與日本：一部近代中日關係史的縮影》（臺北：中央研究院近代史研究所，2012）；黃自進（主編），《蔣中正先生留日學習實錄》（臺北：中正文教基金會，2001）、黃自進（主編），《蔣中正先生對日言論選集》（臺北：中正文教基金會，2004）。

擅長，從廣泛的脈絡著眼，以具體的個案入手，研析探討之所得，可說都是史家技藝的精彩展現。

以近代中國的政治變遷而言，外來的多重國際力量因素，當然扮演了重要角色。可是，那些帶來變化的國際力量本身的實相，又是如何？倘若僅止於漫筆揮洒，一筆帶過，甚或逕直冠以「帝國主義侵略」等等的「帽子」，恐怕只具有營構國族主義意識形態的作用。即如日本一橋大學江夏由樹教授的論文，述說「東亞勸業株式会社」的來龍去脈，指陳它的問世，自然和日本在中國東北（或云「滿州」／「滿洲」）的擴張「國策」直接相關；只是，參與其事者，不論是日本人、中國人乃至於朝鮮人，同時企圖於其間極盡能事地競逐一己之利。潛伏在歷史大潮之下的，正包括了你爭我奪的「黑暗世界」。中央研究院近代史研究所的黃自進教授分析 1952 年的《中日和平條約》歷經了什麼樣的折衝交涉，方始簽署生效，他觀注的視野，除了中華民國與日本交涉兩造以外，更詳究隱身於幕後的美國的遠東政策，如何隨勢而轉。他們的研究成果，充分顯示了，那些與一己研究相涉的對象得以誕生面世，自有其本來的歷史脈絡。因此，研究近代中國，萬萬不可忽視「知彼」的重要性，更要盡力挖掘隱匿在歷史表象之下的場景。

近代中國的歷史變化，承受共鑠加壓的內因外力，眾多難盡，研究者必須觀照的面向，更是非可僅止於一端。正如中央研究院近代史研究所陳慈玉教授描述二十世紀上半葉中日兩國水泥產業激烈競爭的場景，就出以抽絲剝繭的手法，細致地解析雙方水泥產業的展開過程，都與政府脫離不了關係。任教於東華大學歷史系的吳翎君教授，綜合析論 1903 年與 1946 年的兩次中美商約的簽訂過程，既注意兩者歷史脈絡的差異，也強調這兩次商約如何牽動中國內部的經濟立法問題。顯然，研究者應該注意的，除了內外之間的交涉視角，還涵括在歷史長河裡如何為之定位安錨的思考。

要為近代中國的千樣萬態，開展歷史定位的事業，進行「概念化」

的工程，自非憑空說法。前行者的業績，不可或忘；卻也必須承認，既有的歷史解釋架構，既是我們開展歷史知識之生產事業的基石，可能會是制約自身歷史認識的「思想攔路虎」。就如中央研究院近代史研究所的許文堂教授，重建乾隆時期大清帝國與暹羅關係的歷史過程，具體指出，其實那時大清帝國對暹羅自身的政治變局並無確切認識，即令暹羅重視與大清帝國的外交關係或朝貢關係，也未堅持拒絕中國朝貢體制之意識形態，卻以暹羅為中心的世界觀進行詮釋。他的研究，應可啓示，那些在近代中國史研究的領域裡曾經流行一時的「宏大理論」（如與本文相關的「朝貢貿易」理論），不應該視為絕對真理或是金科玉律，反而要出以具體的個案，開展更精密的檢討思索，⁹始可避免將複雜的歷史圖像「簡單化」的潛在危險。

同樣的，那些在我們的生活世界裡曾經（乃至於當下）充滿生命力的基本政治概念與辭彙，往往也不是「理所當然」，它們究竟是在什麼樣的具體歷史時空脈絡裡生成定著，成為我們表述思考時，指方引路的基本單位，更是有待開展的事業。目前任教於日本立教大学的松浦正孝教授，從日本「亞細亞主義」（アジア主義）的思想脈絡裡，以松井石根及其「大亞細亞協會」的活動言論為分析對象，追索曾被喧嚷一時的「大東亞戰爭」論述的問世過程，指出其間積蘊的乃是前近代的亞洲區域觀（premodern Asian regionalism）而非現代的民族國家（modern nation-state）架構的認知。筆者勾勒晚清中國的「民主經驗」，則探討當時各式各樣書寫「民主經驗」的成果，論證它們具有的「思想資源」的意義。拙作研治之所得，期可顯示，「民主」思想導入晚清以降的中國，並不是「水到渠成」的事；筆者進而申論，想要進行「民主」思想在中國的知識生產事業，最好能將多樣複雜的歷史場景「脈絡化」，盡可能詳縝

9 當然，這並不是說前此絕無挑戰「朝貢貿易」理論的學者，如濱下武志即已著先鞭，箇中詳情，自非本文所可開展（不過，許文堂並未徵引濱下武志的論著）。

細密地還諸其本來的歷史時空。

往昔胡適面對此起彼湧的「新思潮」的時候，主張以「評判的態度」來重新估定它們的價值和意義。¹⁰ 其實，這種「評判的態度」在近代中國史研究的天地裡，也一體適用。既有的歷史解釋與理論，可能是以「事後之明」而將曖昧繁複的歷史「簡單化」、「標籤化」的結果。當然，超越意識形態的障礙，挑戰既存的學術業績，期可促成史學事業的進步，並不意味著不需要借鑒於先行者的積累。正如傅斯年當年在北平大學講臺上對修課學生提出的警告一般：

新史料之發見與應用，實是史學進步的最要條件；然而但持新材料，而與遺傳者接不上氣，亦每每是枉然。從此可知抱殘守缺，深固閉拒，不知擴充史料者，固是不可救藥之妄人；而一味平地造起，不知積薪之勢，相因然後可以居上者，亦難免于狂狷者之徒勞也。¹¹

在「抱殘守缺」和「一味平地造起」之間，並不是沒有平衡點的。浙江大學陳紅民教授探索蔣廷黻籌組「中國自由黨」的歷史的成果，就是例證。陳教授充分利用現在典藏於美國哈佛大學燕京圖書館的〈蔣廷黻資料〉（Archives of Dr. Tsiang Tingfu）這批新出土的史料，細膩描述處於時代變局裡的知識人的政治活動。他的研究，繼承既有的業績，也注意蔣廷黻個人政治理念的脈絡，又能將新史料與既有之歷史述說，相互比對參照，冀可逼近歷史實相。

開發新史料，自是史學進步的動力泉源，也是史學工作者的基本職

責之一；不過，對於那些早已問世而為史學社群同仁共曉能詳的史料，若能轉換不同的角度，選取不同的視野，施予精密閱讀的工夫，必然也能拓展簇新的認知空間。例如，出身於同文館，擔任過大清帝國駐英欽差大臣的張德彝，從十九歲起就開始就出洋遠遊，見識異國風情的多番樣貌，《稿本航海述奇匯編》這套大書，就是他紀錄自身經驗的珍貴史料。¹² 日本學者手代木有兒教授與筆者都採取類似的視角，注意晚清中國人在西方國家的異域體驗，也同樣都徵引這部史料。只是，手代木教授關心的課題，只及於張德彝個人文明觀的變化歷程；¹³ 筆者則具體論證張德彝的論說如何成為後來者如王韜的「思想資源」。兩相比對，各有擅長。舉此一例，或可顯示，即便懷持不同的問題意識，處理同樣的材料，但若都能採取細致的書寫手法，還是能讓吾人對過往的歷史圖像，得到愈形精密的認識。

約略總結，本書刊佈的諸篇佳作，方方面面，都是研究者個人獨特的關懷和視野之展現；本書全帙之構成，當然欠缺前後一致照顧周全的理路。可是，史學工作者觀照的「過去」，本來就只會是歷史全景的一方角落；只要他們生產的歷史知識，得以光照一隅，並且自成一格，展其巧妙，便有貢獻。況且，各篇論文之所得，在在提醒後繼的史學工作者，與其費精耗神於在理論層面質疑「近代中國」，耍玩精巧的概念遊戲，不如從實證的角度，對近代中國政治與外交領域裡的多重歷史課題，深耕細作，從而為反省思索什麼是「近代中國」的工作，提供具體的例證。無論是開發新的史料還是就近取材既存易得的材料，抑或重行省思基本概念與辭彙之形塑的歷史過程，乃至於重視個別歷史現象裡潛藏的權力／利益的戲碼，對於「近代中國」的意義追問，就不會落得只能在

10 胡適，〈新思潮的意義〉，《胡適文存》（上海：亞東圖書館，1921），卷4，頁152-153。

11 傅斯年，〈史學方法導論〉，《傅斯年全集》（臺北：聯經出版事業公司，1980），冊2，頁40。

12 張德彝，《稿本航海述奇匯編》（北京：北京圖書館出版社，1997）；全帙10冊。

13 手代木有兒，《清末中國の西洋体験と文明觀》（東京：汲古書院，2013），頁103-132。

抽象思惟的天空上遨遊的命運。可以說，研治近代中國政治與外交歷史的事業，如何鼓振雄風，怎樣開展持續，本書顯然具有範本藍圖的參照價值。

三、小 結

原口清是當代日本研究明治維新史的知名學者，出生於 1922 年的他，少年時分是德富蘇峰系列歷史著作的愛讀者，終竟成為「皇國史觀」的熱心信奉者。到日本戰敗之後，曾經親上戰場的原口清，重行反省，方始扭轉了自己的認識，更願以徹底瞭解為什麼日本維新事業推動的結果，居然會是走上轉向於天皇制國家的道路，做為此後治史問學志業之所嚮。¹⁴ 確實，現代史學做為「學科」(discipline) 往往與民族／國家的發展共謀同向，史學研究與書寫和民族／國家的締造過程，緊密相連，¹⁵ 號稱「科學的」歷史研究，其實難免是(為民族／國家)製造「迷思」(myth) 的研究；¹⁶ 政治與外交領域裡的歷史研究／書寫成果，往往特別具有這等「效果」。¹⁷ 「痛定思痛」，像原口清這樣願將生命體驗與學術志業結

合在一起的史學工作者，應該值得後學景仰風從。

然而，就像追問凱撒(100-44 BC) 渡過盧比孔河(the Rubicon river) 的意義，與其他成千上萬的人同樣渡過這條河，究竟有什麼不同一般，¹⁸ 過往的歷史舞臺上，有那些問題值得追問求索，絕對沒有標準竿尺，怎樣詮解其意涵，也沒有標準答案，都是史學工作者自己選擇的結果。近代中國的歷史過程，千樣萬態，開展政治與外交史領域裡的知識探索事業，並不具有優位霸權的地位。尤其在目前的處境裡，「以色列無王，諸事可為」，願意選擇什麼題目，矢志投身於那個領域，恁憑史學工作者的自由意志。可是，如果「只要我喜歡，有什麼不可以」式的歷史解釋，弊端無限，必須被伐而撻之，蓋如新納粹之流的政治墮落(political depravity) 正得以從這裡找到他們大肆活動的空間；¹⁹ 那麼，史學工作者對自身開展史學事業的抉擇，就只因為那些歷史問題「有趣」、「好玩」，甚或同樣懷持「只要我喜歡，有什麼不可以」的態度；至於那些題目、選擇與其成果，究竟和我們追求理想的生活世界有什麼關係，是否能夠多少供應一些足以揭示當下生活體制絕非「理所當然」的思想資源，則非反省之所在。可以說，這等抉擇與做為，恐怕只不過是「史學虛無主義」(historical nihilism) 的知識生產活動，非但不能跳脫先入之見的支配制約，更不免為現實諸多的霸權暴政提供「凡存在必合理」的歷史見證，放任特定意識形態製作的「歷史記憶」長流久存，供應「觀

14 原口清，〈回顧点描——一歴史学徒の軌跡——〉，《幕末中央政局の動向》，《原口清著作集》，1（東京：岩田書院，2007），頁9。

15 參見：Stefan Berger, et. al., eds., *Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800* (London: Routledge, 1999)；此書綜合英、法、德、義四國在十九世紀以來的史學民族主義(historiographic nationalism) 而論。

16 Chris Lorenz, "Drawing the Line: 'Scientific' History between Myth-making and Myth-breaking," in Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas, and Andrew Mycock, edited, *Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media, and the Arts* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 35-55；然而，他也指陳，「科學的」歷史研究與製造「迷思歷史」(mythistory)，其實是可以畫界分域的。

17 筆者即以史界前輩羅香林的《國父家世源流考》(1942年初版) 為例，論證這部史學著作也具有濃烈的「政治效果」，意在為國民黨黨國體制的「支配意識形態」找尋歷史正當性，見：潘光哲，〈詮釋「國父」：以羅香林的《國父家世源流考》為例〉，《香港中國近代史學報》，期3（香港：中國近代史學會，

2005），頁57-76。

18 這當然是承襲 E. H. Carr 的論說，參見：E. H. Carr, with a new introduction by Richard J. Evans, *What is History?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001 [40th Anniversary ed.]), pp. 5-6. (參考：愛德華·卡耳〔著〕，江政寬〔譯〕，《何謂歷史？》〔臺北：博雅書屋，2009〕，頁105-106。)

19 Keith Windschuttle, "A Critique of the Postmodern Turn in Western Historiography," in Q. Edward Wang, Georg G. Iggers, edited, *Turning Points in Historiography: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), p. 275.

念的暴政」恣意做爲的無窮動力。²⁰ 固然，史學工作者的學術實踐，不可能提供解決現實問題的標準答案，也難能設定突破存在困境的金科玉律；但是，倘若在開展史學知識的生產事業的時候，掙脫不了「史學虛無主義」的束縛，實在也太辜負自己選擇這個行業做爲安身立命之道了。²¹

史學家本人與他的著作，是他在世間爲人知曉的兩種身體樣態（historian's two bodies）；只是，史學家的工作業績一旦問世，會引發何等的迴響，無可料知。這兩個身體之間的衝突矛盾或曖昧，無時或已。²² 回顧前此近代中國政治外交史的既有業績，或許不免隨特定的意識形態而起舞共行；在意識形態的藩籬已被激垮的此際，那種好似「不證自明」的絕對真理，必然不會是我們開展學術事業的起步前提。那麼，如何避

20 正如當代德國史學家蒙森（Wolfgang J. Mommsen）所言，道德承擔（moral commitment）與學術中立，正是評判史家技藝同樣重要的判準，見：Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Moral Commitment and Scholarly Detachment: The Social Function of the Historian," in Joep Leerssen and Ann Rigney, edited, *Historians and Social Values* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), p. 45.

21 即如美國史家利斯（Steven A. Riess）回顧自身的治史歷程，喜歡觀看體育運動比賽的他，在1968年成爲芝加哥大學的研究生之後，發現當時史家前輩大都以民族國家之形成，或是革命，或是中央政府、地方政治乃至相關的政治經濟思想等等爲研究主題，想與個人興趣相結合的「體育史」（history of sports）領域則乏人問津，理由也很簡單，年輕一輩的史學工作者擔心以此一領域做爲論文題目，會讓自己找不到工作。可以說，「運動史」在當時美國史界，沒有正當性（legitimacy）。利斯毅然投入之後，當然也不免挫折，只是，他認爲，既然「體育史」就像經濟大蕭條、原子彈與大屠殺（the Holocaust）一樣都是人類行爲的必有之物，那麼，就應該像其他領域的史學研究一般，必須出以同樣的高水準專業技藝（highly specialized craft），進行研究。在他看來，研究美國體育史，就應當注意移民、階級、種族、教育與都市化等等因素，乃至於如何凝聚打造青少年的核心價值觀念等方面，始可創造出具有真正學術價值的作品，而讓我們對瞭解人類處境的某一方面，得到啟示。他自信自己對「運動史」的研究，可以讓理解認識（城市化的）美國社會裡的行爲、價值和態度，確有啟發，見：Steven A. Riess, "I am not a Baseball Historian", in Alun Munslow, edited, *Authoring the Past: Writing and Rethinking History* (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 53-65.

22 參見：Nathan Uglow, *The Historian's Two Bodies: The Reception of Historical Texts in France, 1701-1790* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2001).

免「史學虛無主義」的魔障泥淖，懷持藉著理解過去而嘗試解答自身處境的問題意識，以豐瞻精確的史料爲基礎，細膩描摹勾勒近代中國政治外交歷史舞臺上的方方面面，力求逼近歷史的本來面目，儘可能地還原那些具體存在而又多樣複雜的歷史事實，必然是史學工作者得面對的永恆挑戰。本書收錄的諸篇鴻文佳篇，作者固是自有獨特關懷，彼此之間，儼然分潤同享這樣的默會共識。得失所在之處，是否功不唐捐，自有待學界公評共議。

路長遠兮。近代中國政治與外交的歷史，諸相共呈，卻也隱諱多端，值得學界同好投注心力，繼續奮鬥拓展的學術／知識空間，仍然寬廣無限。但願本書的出版，對於共有所好的史學社群同仁，略具提醒助益之功，那必然是作者與編者最大的榮幸。

致 謝

本書集結中央研究院主辦第四屆漢學會議發表於近代史研究所的相關論文而成。各篇論著，率皆自成一家言，實是近代中國政治外交史領域最新成果的展現。筆者承司總匯諸篇佳作之責，爰以「野人獻曝」之心，略釋各篇要旨，抒發個人心得體會，或有助於讀者。惟筆者駑鈍寡知，思慮有關，或難揚其美富，扶幽發微之引譬，更未必允當宜洽。凡此諸弊，如得蒙原來作者諒之，前輩識者教之，必爲筆者之幸。一切議論之文責，率皆與各文作者無關，應由筆者個人承負。

方以近代中國政治外交史爲主題而籌備召開會議之初始，相關工作的規劃，皆由中央研究院近代史研究所林美莉教授總其繁難，功莫大焉，勞動所在，不可忘懷。爾後由筆者接手，承司指揮調度具體相關業務，竟得忝列本書主編，實是榮寵之至。會議籌備，得到黃克武所長、黃自進教授的全力支持；會議之召開舉行，復蒙張玉法、張啓雄與陳慈玉等

教授主持各發表場次；又勞張力、沙培德、呂妙芬、江燦騰、劉季倫等教授對會議之舉行，全書之編輯出版工作，屢屢惠賜卓見，提供助力。凡此先進同仁之恩誼，自當永銘吾輩心懷。本書之編輯出版，所得助力甚眾，林秀娟女士協助往來聯絡，張珍琳女士校對編輯協助，獻力無限，亦須特表謝忱。如果本書能夠讓近代中國政治外交史的研究，得以欣欣向榮，花開滿園，提供積蓄若干動力，自當歸功於各方先進同仁，編者謹此願致謝悃。

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乾隆時期的清暹關係

許文堂*

一、前言

清高宗乾隆時期（1736-1795）號稱有「十大武功」，計有乾隆十二年至十四年（1747-1749）平大小金川、乾隆十九年（1755）平定準噶爾、乾隆二十二年（1757）再平準噶爾、及平定回部大小和卓、乾隆二十七年至三十四年間（1762-1769）征緬甸、乾隆三十八年至四十一年（1773-1776）再平大小金川、乾隆五十一年至五十二年（1787-1788）平臺灣林爽文、乾隆五十四年（1789）平安南、乾隆五十六年至乾隆五十七年（1791-1792）兩平廓爾喀。¹ 四十五年間陸續有二十二年處於征戰，今姑不論歷次所戰是否皆捷，其國力民生耗費問題嚴重，² 而探究乾隆時期對於諸外國的認識如何？清初對周邊國家關係是否止於「朝貢」的宗

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- 1 1792年再平廓爾喀後，乾隆自作《十全記》以紀其事：「十功者，平準噶爾為二，定回部為一，掃金川為二，靖臺灣為一，降緬甸、安南各一，即今二次受廓爾喀降，合為十」。乾隆帝因自稱「十全老人」。相關研究可參考莊吉發，《清高宗十全武功研究》（臺北：國立故宮博物院，1982）。
- 2 歷次軍需耗費超過一億一千萬兩銀，可參考趙翼，《簞曝雜記》（臺北：中華書局，1957）；另據《清史稿》，卷125，〈食貨六〉，乾隆所耗軍費則超過一億五千萬兩銀，頁3709-3710。

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Matsui Iwane's "Greater Asianism" and China*

Matsuura Masataka 松浦正孝 **

Introduction

How should we understand the ideology of Japanese Asianism, which led to the "Greater East Asian War" in the Asia-Pacific region? During the period of Taisho Democracy (大正デモクラシー), the economist Ishibashi

* Much of what follows is drawn from 松浦正孝・〈「大東亜戦争」はなぜ起きたのか：汎アジア主義の政治経済史〉(名古屋：名古屋大学出版会・2010)[Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur? — A Political and Economic History of Pan-Asianism*]. I cannot, in the space available to me here, summarize this 1,080 page book in its entirety or fully describe the relationship between Matsui Iwane and the various groups in Japan and China addressed in this essay. For greater detail, please reference this work. Japanese book titles are given both in translation and in the original. All names are given in characters on first appearance, and transcribed according to local convention, surname first for East Asian names. Diacritical marks have been omitted from words familiar to readers in English, e.g. Tokyo not Tōkyō. Chinese words are rendered according to the Pinyin system unless well-known by an alternative, e.g. Chiang Kai-shek rather than Jiang Jieshi. This paper was translated by Edward Kieran Boyle and Michael Isaac Shapiro. I would like to appreciate the very useful comments by the screening committee.

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Tanzan (石橋湛山) called for a "Small Japanism" founded upon colonial liberation and peaceful trade. The political scientist Yoshino Sakuzo (吉野作造) criticized Japan's colonial policies in Korea, sympathized with the aims of the Korean March 1st and the Chinese May 4th Movements, and supported Korean students in Japan. In the financial world, there were those who thought that Japan and China should cooperate peacefully and develop Asia.¹ These views formed part of the wide spectrum of thought included under the rubric of Asianism in this imperial era. However, after the Great Depression and the Manchurian Incident, amongst Japanese Asianism the strength of the Pan-Asianists became overwhelming and Japan headed towards the "Greater East Asian War". From amongst these Asianists, in this essay I shall focus on Matsui Iwane (松井石根) and his Greater Asia Association (大亜細亞協會), and introduce the policies towards China that Pan-Asianism advocated.

Studies of Japan's diplomatic and military history thus far have not clarified who the agent responsible for starting the "Greater East Asian War" was. It is well known that the Kwantung Army (關東軍) under the leadership of Ishihara Kanji (石原莞爾) was behind Japan's invasion of Manchuria. However, most studies of the Second Sino-Japanese War emphasize that this war emerged from an accidental skirmish occurring in the field and that most of the agents involved, including the military and the Foreign Ministry, were opposed to expanding the war. Likewise, in the case of the "Greater East Asian War", which Japan fought against America, Britain, and Holland as an extension of the Second Sino-Japanese War, many studies argue that Japan was pushed towards war by economic sanctions imposed by America. Hence,

¹ 松浦正孝, 「大東亞戦争」はなぜ起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史, 第二章 [Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*, Chapter 2].

what actually caused the "Greater East Asian War" remains unclear. Researchers have not yet explained what vision lay behind the "Greater East Asian War". This essay argues that the Pan-Asianism of the Greater Asia Association, for which Matsui Iwane acted as president, was the foremost proponent of the "Greater East Asian War". In what follows, I attempt to clarify this group's worldview and, in particular, their policies toward China.

Matsui Iwane is largely remembered today as responsible for the Japanese militarism behind the Nanjing Massacre. Certainly, as Commander-in-Chief during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Matsui eagerly sought to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's (蔣介石) government. However, in his younger days he had supported Sun Yat-sen (孫文) and Chiang's national revolution, had many friends in the Guomindang (國民黨), and was known as the foremost China Hand in the army. Those who revered Matsui called him Tragic Commander and the Showa Warrior (悲劇の将軍・昭和の聖将), claiming that, despite his hopes for Sino-Japanese friendship, he was found guilty by the Tokyo Trial and hung for crimes he did not commit. At the trial, no evidence was presented of criminal conspiracy or prosecuting a war of aggression against China, but as the Commander held responsible for the massacre at Nanjing, he was sentenced to hang. The presiding judge, Sir William Webb, at no stage referred to Matsui's leadership of the Pan-Asianist organization called the Greater Asia Association or his promotion of the Pan-Asianist movement. Postwar historians have also focused on the questions of how many people were killed and who was responsible for the Nanjing Massacre. While the source base is limited, it is striking that Matsui's political role and diplomatic views, and the Greater Asia Association, have remained largely unresearched. While there has been much florid debate over the responsibility for war crimes, researchers have overlooked the fact

that Matsui and the Greater Asia Association represented the most important and mainstream brand of Pan-Asianism in the period from the Second Sino-Japanese War to the “Greater East Asian War”. How are we to understand this historical lacuna? As the Commander of the Central China Area Army, Matsui Iwane was at the center of Japan’s prosecution of war against China, and the members of the Greater Asia Association were the most influential force in determining policy toward China after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, beginning with the Institute for Asian Restoration and the installation of Wang Jingwei (汪精衛) as Premier of China. The Koiso Cabinet could even be described as the cabinet of this group, because Prime Minister Koiso had been a sympathizer of the Association and sharing the framework of their Pan-Asianism and some of the high officials had strong connection with them.² Without clarifying what their agenda was, we cannot solve the mystery of the “Greater East Asian War”. How did Matsui and other members of the Greater Asia Association bring their Pan-Asianism into being, where did they position China in their geopolitical schema of Pan-Asianism, and what role did they have play in formulating Japanese policy? This essay attempts to answer these questions.

In this study, which utilizes hitherto unused sources such as the membership lists of the Greater Asia Association and Matsui’s postwar memoirs, and reinterprets Matsui’s diary and other fundamental sources, a hypothesis regarding this group’s Pan-Asianist views on China will be offered.

2 松浦正孝, 〈日中戦争から第二次世界大戦へ〉, 和田春樹他編, 《岩波講座 東アジア近現代通史 第六巻 アジア太平洋戦争と「大東亜共栄圏」1935-1945年》(東京:岩波書店, 2011) [Matsuura Masataka, “From the Sino-Japanese War to the Second World War,” Wada Haruki et al eds., *Iwanami Lectures on the East Asian History of the Modern Times*, Vol. 6, *The Asia-Pacific War and “the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere” 1935-1945*].

The Course of Matsui Iwane’s Pan-Asianism

Matsui Iwane was born in 1878, the sixth son of a former Nagoya samurai Matsui Takekuni (松井武國). Bequeathed large debts by his father, the slight and sickly yet determined Matsui, together with his younger brother Shichio (松井七夫), attended the Army Cadet School which charged no tuition as well as the Army College and embarked on a military career. Partially due to the influence of his Sinologist father, Matsui was given a grounding in the Chinese classics and developed a strong interest in China. While at the Army Cadet School, Matsui studied Chinese intensively and was impressed by the rhetoric of the Satsuma native Kawakami Sōroku (川上操六) at the time of the First Sino-Japanese War, who stated that “The Japanese army exists to preserve peace in the Orient.”³ During his time at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, Matsui came to greatly respect the thought of his fellow Nagoya native Arao Sei (荒尾精), and focused his attention upon the issue of China. For Matsui, the Japanese Army’s continental policy since the time of Kawakami Sōroku had been to unite all Asian countries against European aggression. Kawakami had dispatched Arao to China and other followers to Southeast Asia in order to encourage the co-operation of other Asian peoples, foment independence, and form an Asian union, although Matsui later insisted there was no intention to exclude the white race. The importance Kawakami placed on intelligence saw the likes of Fukushima Yasumasa (福島安正), Uehara Yusaku (上原勇作), Utsunomiya Taro (宇

3 新田満夫, 《極東国際軍事裁判速記録》(東京:雄松堂書店, 1968) [Nitta Mitsuo, *The International Military Tribunal for the Far East Shorthand Notes*], 巻7頁417、号309頁9、同巻10頁375、号410頁25。

都宮太郎), and Akashi Motojiro (明石元二郎)⁴ dispatched to all corners of the globe. After the First Sino-Japanese War, Kawakami placed great importance on the “heart of peace in East Asia”, Taiwan, being used as a staging post for the advance into south China and Southeast Asia.

Matsui and the Greater Asia Association adopted Arao Sei as a pioneer of Greater Asianism. Arao had been born in 1859 into an impoverished family in Nagoya, and with the aid of a Satsuma police officer, he passed from the Foreign Languages Academy and the Army Leader’s Group (an organization aimed at nurturing non-commissioned officers) into the Army War College, where he became a lieutenant. Encouraged by the Satsuma leader Saigo Takamori’s (西郷隆盛) argument for Korean intervention, he is said to have opposed the advance of the Western powers into Asia. In 1886, on commission from the China section of the General Staff to cross into China and engage in intelligence gathering, Arao set up the Rakuzendo (楽善堂) in Hankou, a company trading in books, medicines, and other miscellaneous goods, and using this as cover, he sent agents out to investigate conditions across China. Following this, arguing the necessity of both enriching the country, strengthening the army (富國強兵) and Sino-Japanese cooperation, he sought to increase Sino-Japanese trade and founded the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Institute (日清貿易研究所), the forerunner of the East Asian Cultural Society (東亞同文會). Arao presented the results of his analysis of information from the continent to Kawakami in draft form,⁵ but died of

4 On this, see 佐藤守男, 《情報戦争と参謀本部 — 日露戦争と辛亥革命》(東京: 芙蓉書房, 2011) [Satō Morio, *The Information War and General Staff: The Russo-Japanese War and the 1911 Revolution*].

5 佐藤守男, 《情報戦争と参謀本部 — 日露戦争と辛亥革命》[Satō Morio, *The Information War and General Staff*], 頁 293。

illness soon after.

In Japan, following the failure of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (豊臣秀吉) invasion of the continent, a variant of the Ming Court’s maritime prohibition system (海禁制度) known as sakoku policy (鎖國政策) had been adopted for over 200 years during Tokugawa rule. As a result, the trade links and maritime networks that existed in the Medieval period, including those of the Wako (倭寇), were sundered, and the Japan towns in Asia with their accompanying political and economic activities were abandoned. Japanese people were essentially banned from traveling abroad. As a result, the East Asian seas had fallen under the control of the overseas Chinese, Ryukyuan traders, and the merchant companies of the Western powers, and mid-nineteenth-century Japan had clearly felt threatened by its exclusion from the main routes of international trade. In particular, misgivings were felt by those connected to the government about the trade networks of the overseas Chinese and the steamship lines of the Western nations. According to a lecture Arao gave in 1889, Japan’s most urgent task was to strengthen the nation, and he emphasised the importance of increasing trade in order to achieve sufficient military preparedness to compete with the existing Great Powers, which is why he himself had resigned from the army to devote himself to foreign trade. However, the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Institute was not merely a foreign trading company, but an organization which, through Asian trade, sought to restore Japanese influence and pave the way for future military development, all with a view to realizing the Asianism led by Japan Arao thought necessary to protect Asia. The Institute sought to mold talent in the field of Sino-Japanese trade by emphasising the importance of speaking Chinese and teaching things important to business in China, such as local weights and measures. These Japanese were to speak

Chinese fluently, learn local customs, adopt Chinese dress, and blend seamlessly into the Chinese masses in order to gather intelligence. When the First Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Institute's graduates were co-opted by Vice-Chief of Staff Kawakami Sōroku and largely utilized for espionage and translation.

Japanese economists and Asianists could not escape the knowledge that Asian trade and economic activity was, even after the Western advance, largely under the control of Chinese and overseas Chinese. In 1885, Mori Arinori (森有礼), the first Minister for Education, on the occasion of opening a merchant academy in Osaka stated the following: "Japanese merchants are unable to compete with Chinese, but the Chinese outstrip even the Western merchants. While the Western powers are reducing China to a semi-colonial situation, policing her ports and setting up factories, in truth British and French merchants are still largely losing out to their Chinese counterparts. This is true anywhere, in Hong Kong, Singapore or Saigon. Chinese merchants do not trade fairly, and vanquish foreign competition before their competitors are aware of what is happening."⁶ Mori concluded that these merchants had no great feelings for the Qing state or government, as there were focused solely on trade and profit, and Japanese merchants needed to take their existence into account.

The Western imperial powers, the British Empire foremost among them, with their leases of ports and railway concessions centered on Shanghai, could be seen as strengthening their hold over Asia, but trade and economic activity were in the hands of Chinese merchants and the overseas Chinese.⁷

6 木村匡, 《森先生伝》(東京:金港堂書籍, 1889) [Kimura Masashi, *The Biography of Mister Mori*], 頁 199-212.

7 籠谷直人, 《アジア国際通商秩序と近代日本》(名古屋:名古屋大学出版会,

This was not only due to their trading activities, but what Furuta Kazuko (古田和子) has called the Shanghai network, the strong and comprehensive exchange network⁸ that allowed for information and currency exchange, credit facilities, and so forth. The compradors English-speaking Chinese merchants, were also important,⁹ and there was little room for Western commercial expansion.

It is particularly notable that a similar concern regarding Chinese merchants pervaded the thought of Miura Tetsutaro (三浦鏡太郎), the Toyo Keizai Shinpo (東洋經濟新報) editor who bequeathed the notion of Small Japanism to his disciple Ishibashi Tanzan when arguing that Japan should relinquish Manchuria. From an entirely economic standpoint, Miura argued that although prior to the Russo-Japanese War Russia had received various concessions in Manchuria and had invested a great deal of capital, in the end economic expansion was driven by the politically disadvantaged Chinese merchants. Subsequently, as Japan received from Russia the South Manchurian Railway after the war, the management of Manchuria and the military expansion necessary to secure it had consumed a vast amount of capital, and once again the economic advantages and prosperity had accrued to Chinese merchants. For Miura, the same applied to the various Western imperial powers in Hong Kong, Vietnam, and other overseas possessions. Miura

2000) [Kagotani Naoto, *The Asian Commercial System and Modern Japan*].

8 古田和子, 《上海ネットワークと近代東アジア》(東京:東京大学出版会, 2000) [Furuta Kazuko, *Shanghai Network: the Economic Order in Late Nineteenth-century East Asia*].

9 本野英一, 《伝統中国商業秩序の崩壊 — 不平等条約体制と「英語を話す中国人」》(名古屋:名古屋大学出版会, 2004) [Motono Eiichi, *The Collapse of the Traditional Chinese Commercial Network: The Unequal Treaty System and "English-speaking Chinese"*].

further noted that in Taiwan, the massive Japanese capital investment in bureaucracy and policing was bringing prosperity and economic growth to the Chinese, and that with the exception of the sugar industry, Japanese merchants were being driven out by their Chinese counterparts. Miura emphasised that the main players in Taiwanese economics and government should be the islanders themselves.¹⁰

As late as 1940, Japanese with commercial links were continuing to make the argument that Japanese should make use of Taiwanese, who had lifestyles, language, and customs that were similar to overseas Chinese, in order to wrest control of south and Southeast Asia from the overseas Chinese and Chinese merchant capital.¹¹ The colony of Taiwan and the Taiwanese, with their close links to regions along the Chinese coast, as well as the overseas Chinese who cooperated with the Japanese, were for the Japanese Empire important tools for contesting the power of the governments of the Qing and the Republic of China. Whether looked at economically, militarily, or diplomatically, Taiwan was a base for Japanese Asianism.

In 1901 (Meiji 34), the East Asian Cultural Institute (東亜同文書院) was founded in Shanghai as an outgrowth of the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Institute, with Arai's comrade Nezu Hajime (根津一) as first director and with the backing of the head of the East Asian Cultural Society, Konoe Atsumaro (近衛篤磨). The East Asian Cultural Society had been founded in 1899 with branches in Beijing, Shanghai, Hankou, Fujian, and Guangdong by a graduate of the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Institute,

10 松浦正孝・「大東亞戦争」はなぜ起きたのか：汎アジア主義の政治経済史
[Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 頁 113-121.

11 松浦正孝・「大東亞戦争」はなぜ起きたのか：汎アジア主義の政治経済史
[Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 頁 281.

Shiraiwa Ryuhei (白岩龍平), to research Sino-Japanese issues and promote the development of trade and manufacturing. At the Shanghai office were the likes of Shiraiwa himself, Murata Shozo (村田省蔵, later chairman of the Osaka Merchant Marine) and Lieutenant Matsui Iwane. With support from the government and the army, Shiraiwa set up shipping lines between China and Japan and along the Chinese coast that competed successfully with Chinese ventures. At the East Asian Cultural Institute, like the Sino-Japanese Trade Research Institute before it, students were drilled extensively for three years in Chinese language, Qing trade customs, weights and measures, and coinage. Upon completion of their training, the graduates, being barely distinguishable from their Chinese counterpart were dispatched to all parts of China to engage in a variety of economic activities. Dressed in their Chinese clothes, these individuals cut out Chinese middlemen and went directly to the silk and cotton producing regions like Henan (河南), buying directly from the producers themselves. These men, who sought both commercial advantage and military intelligence, later became the building blocks of the Greater Asia Association. This human network created by Konoe Atsumaro's East Asian Cultural Society and East Asian Cultural Institute would together with its Asianism be inherited by Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文磨). Moreover, Matsui Iwane, who followed in the footsteps of his mentor Arai Sei, supported Sun Yat-sen and the other revolutionaries even while he gathered information to support Japanese Asianism. Matsui, a China hand, inherited and continued Kawakami Soroku and Arai Sei's continental policy, and was convinced of the importance of intelligence gathering. Following his graduation from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, Matsui was dispatched first to France by staff headquarters, and then, by his own request, was sent to Qing China between the years 1907-11, where he ended up in

Beijing and Shanghai.

Matsui then came to the attention of Utsunomiya Taro, later Section Two Head (Intelligence) at Military Staff Headquarters, one of the followers of Uehara Yusaku whose views were marginalized within the army. The Uehara group centered on former Satsuma and Saga men and developed in opposition to the Choshu faction then dominating both the government and army. The government and armed forces, which in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War had opposed the carve-up of China carried out by Britain and the other Western powers, had departed from the doctrine of "securing the north and advancing south" to preserve the Japanese position in Korea. Utsunomiya and others in the Uehara faction promoted an Asianist expansionary policy which supported the Chinese revolutionaries in the south who sought to overthrow the Qing, aimed to colonize both Korea and China, while expelling Western missionaries, and facilitated a Japanese southern advance. In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Utsunomiya published a report on Taiwan, Korea, and China which recommended that for the spread of civilization and aid of Asian peoples, the Qing state should be broken up and a union of Japan, China, and Korea created. Utsunomiya had co-operated with the Western faction and Zhang Zhidong (張之洞) in accepting Qing students to Japan for many years, and within the southern provinces there was a movement by the governors to form a new federal autonomous government in Nanjing. Utsunomiya responded by joining with the revolutionaries surrounding Sun Yat-sen, and when the elite 8th Army created by Zhang revolted at Wuchang in Hubei, initiating the 1911 revolution, he promoted a continental policy that sought to divide China into a federation of autonomous provinces.

For Utsunomiya, a unified China was a grave threat. While viewing the

Imperial Palace in Beijing in 1913, Utsunomiya was struck by imperial China's great strength and wealth. Although having been subjugated to semi-colonial status since the Opium War, seen from the perspective of imperial China, Japan was merely an imperial pea in the sea (豆の如き島帝國). The strength of the Chinese state on the continent had always influenced Japanese political development, and Japan, out of fear, had modelled itself on the overwhelming economic and cultural power of China. Therefore, a unitary Chinese state was to be avoided, and in opinion pieces such as personal views on China. Utsunomiya stated that in opposing the white Christian imperial powers, China would be a tremendous resource for imperial Japan, as its dismemberment and incorporation into the Empire would increase Japan's strength immeasurably. That is, by officially supporting the Qing Court while clandestinely backing the revolutionaries, separate states for the Manchu and the Han should be founded, with Manchuria becoming a protectorate of the Japanese and the other provinces federated under Japanese control. On the basis of this doctrine, Utsunomiya's followers and those connected with the East Asian Cultural Society sent aid to the revolutionary army while maintaining contact with the Qing Court. The 100,000 yen provided by Iwasaki Hisaya (岩崎久弥) of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu to his confidante Matsui Iwane was used not only to support Sun Yat-sen's forces and the revolutionary army, but also to provide aid to Manchurian and Mongolian independence movement and advance the cause into Southeast Asia. Even after the overthrow of the Qing and the cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), Utsunomiya sought to construct a Greater Japanese Empire through the division of China and expansion into Manchuria, west Asia, and Southeast Asia, and he continued to call for opposition to the West and Co-existence and Co-prosperity (共存)

共榮) in Asia.

Matsui Iwane and the Japanese Army in the Build-up to the Manchurian Incident

In accordance with Utsunomiya's thought, Matsui did not limit his career to South China but also worked in Manchuria and French Indochina. At the time, top graduates of the War Academy like Matsui were not looking to work in China itself. But by his own request, Matsui was sent to China and worked under the military attaché at the Embassy, Aoki Nobuzumi (青木宣純), widely recognized as the foremost China hand for his activities during the Russo-Japanese War. In contrast to later China hands such as Banzai Rihachiro (坂西利八郎) and Dohihara Kenji (土肥原賢二) who had strong connections with the Beijing government, North China and Manchuria, Aoki worked for a long time in Nanjing and Shanghai and supported Sun Yat-sen and the southern government's national revolution against Yuan Shikai's efforts to reestablish the imperial state. To this end, Matsui worked under Aoki, traveling to various parts of China and strengthening his links with Sun Yat-sen and other members of the Guomindang. Following this, Matsui and in what was an unusual move for a China hand, became the Section Two Head at Military Staff Headquarters from 1925-1928.

Prior to this period, Japan's attitude toward China, associated particularly with Shidehara's Foreign Policy (幣原外交), had been characterized by a much greater degree of flexibility than the Western powers. Matsui's tenure at Staff Headquarters, however, overlapped with the Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) Cabinet, which is generally thought to be as the one that took much firmer

attitude towards China than before. The hardline views associated with the Kwantung Army Chief-of-Staff Komoto Daisaku (河本大作) and Parliamentary Vice-minister for Foreign Affairs Mori Tsutomu (森恪) had been well-noted, but Matsui and Prime Minister Tanaka aimed to support Chiang Kai-shek as long as the latter moderated his attitude towards Manchuria's Zhang Zuolin (張作霖). However, in 1927 when Chiang was out of power and visited Japan, he met Prime Minister Tanaka through Matsui's mediation. It was at this time that the ultimate clash between Tanaka's wariness towards Chinese military actions in the north and Chiang's vision of a unified China incorporating Manchuria and Mongolia became apparent. For Matsui the ideal situation was a China divided into three, with Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria, a moderated Chiang Kai-shek in central China, and the anti-Chiang forces in the south, but at the same time moving towards a loose federal republic under Chiang's leadership as a bulwark against communists.

But as is generally known, when Chiang renewed his Northern Expedition, Japan dispatched troops to Shandong for a second time and during the clash between Chinese and Japanese forces, the Jinan Incident occurred. In June 1928, following this incident, a plot to assassinate Zhang Zuolin as he returned to Mukden (on Japanese advice) was enacted. The plot arose from the dissatisfaction of Komoto Daisaku and his colleagues with Prime Minister Tanaka, who had refused to recognize the actions of the Kwantung Army after protestation from the United States. One month prior to Zhang's assassination Komoto sent a letter to the heads of Sections One and Two at Military Staff Headquarters, Araki Sadao (荒木貞夫) and Matsui, in which he asked for recognition of and aid for his plan to use, the Kwantung Army to assassinate Zhang and establish a political authority more

amenable to Japan.¹² However, Army Central Command neither granted permission for nor aided this enterprise. Matsui certainly knew about Komoto's intentions in advance, but how much credence he gave the plan is unclear. However, in so far as Matsui's younger brother Shichio, to whom he was very close, had been sent as an advisor to Zhang Zuolin and was a tireless advocate of Zhang's, it seems unlikely that Matsui himself would have approved of Zhang's assassination. It seems more likely that he wished for some form of reconciliation between North and South China in order to maintain Japan's advantages in Manchuria and Mongolia. In the event, after Zhang Zuolin's assassination, his son Zhang Xueliang (張學良) came under Guomindang control, and Komoto's successor as the Kwantung Army Chief-of-Staff Itagaki Seishiro (板垣征四郎) and his Staff Officer Ishihara Kanji planned the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, after which the Kwantung Army took control of Manchuria and later set up the puppet state of Manchukuo (滿洲國).

For the Manchurian Incident to succeed, the Kwantung Army required the support of the largest of the colonial forces, the Korean Army, which crossed the border into Manchuria without authorization from Tokyo. This was achieved through the request of Ishihara Kanji to the Korean Army Chief-of-Staff Kanda Masatane (神田正種), whose aggressive advocacy persuaded Commander Hayashi Senjuro (林銑十郎) to respond in the affirmative. Participants in the incident in communication with Ishihara, like Kanda and Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本欣五郎), were from the Russian section, but those at Staff Headquarters who supported the incident included

12 三谷太一郎, 〈15年戦争下の日本軍隊〉(上), 《成蹊法学》, 号53(2001)
[Mitani Taichirō, "The Japanese Military during the 15 Years of War," Part 1, *The Journal of Legal, Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 53].

numerous China hands, such as Nemoto Hiroshi (根本博), Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭), Wachi Takaji (和知鷹二), and Cho Isami (長勇). Whether involved with the Manchurian Incident or not, those army officers who made up the upper echelons of the Greater Asia Association in its aftermath were largely either China hands like Matsui Iwane, "Russia hands", like the former military attaches of the Turkish and Polish missions or "British hands" like Indian missions. This indicates that the Greater Asia Association was motivated by opposition to the Chinese, British and Russian empires. The "Turanism" espoused by the linguist Imaoka Juichiro (今岡十一郎), who had a great deal of influence in the Greater Asia Association, called for the revival of the entire Ural-Altai race stretching from Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia in the east, to Turkey and Hungary in the west and Finland and Estonia in the north. According to Imaoka, through the union of these Turanian races, Japan would be provided with an export market for manufactured goods and a mechanism for containing the Western empires, communism and the Chinese. Through it Japan could make the Muslims in Asia, who made up the bulk of Asians, and with Muslim regions such as Manchuria and Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Central Asia, West Asia and Southeast Asia under control, and the safety and security of East Asia would be guaranteed. This Turanism introduced by Imaoka was to have a great effect on the likes of Hayashi Senjuro and Kanda Masatane.

In particular, from the latter half of the 1920s, Hayashi Senjuro focused on turning 'Mokyo' (蒙疆, the region of Qahar and Suiyuan lying between Manchuria and Mongolia) into a second Manchuria as another buffer with the Soviet Union. From 1934, he sought to promote the Japan-Mongolia Society (日蒙協會) and the Good Neighbour Society (善隣協會), and he emphasised the possible role of Islam for Japan's empire, and particularly Islam of the

Turks. First chairman of the Greater Japan-Islamic Society (大日本回教協會) founded in 1938, Hayashi felt that cooperation with Islam was necessary to solve the problem of Mongolia and to oppose the Chinese and Slavic races. Further, Matsumuro Takayoshi (松室孝良), one of the China hands at the center of the Greater Asia Association and a veteran of enterprises in North China, Manchuria, and Mongolia, authored *An Opinion on the Founding of Mongolia* in October 1933, soon after the Manchurian Incident.¹³ In it Matsumuro recommended the creation of a state for Mongols as a means of responding to Mongolian desires, strengthening Manchukuo, aiding Japan's Asianist policy, and helping in the war against the Chinese and Soviets. Drawing parallels with the Manchu Qing alliance with the Mongols in aiding in the rule of the numerically-dominant Han, Matsumuro asserted that a Mongol state should be founded as a sister to the Manchu one established by the Japanese, and thereafter, the Tibetans and Muslims should also be given their independence, such that creating an alliance of states would encircle and enclose China. Matsumuro also suggested that Japan's Greater Asianism could stoke desires for independence in Mongolia, Central Asia, Iran, India, and Indochina, which could further serve to restrain a China that was becoming increasingly anti-Japanese. The Kwantung Army bought into this belief. The Kwantung Army sought to conciliate with Islam, promote movements in Mongolia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and mobilize the religious authority of the Lamas in Mongolia. Subsequently, after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Matsumuro was involved in the founding of a puppet political authority in central China before heading up

13 松室孝良, 「蒙古建設に関する意見」[Matsumuro Takayoshi, "The Opinion on the Founding of Mongolia"], 島田俊彦・稲葉正夫解説, 《現代史資料 8 日中戦争 1》(東京:みすず書房, 1964), 頁 450。

the Greater Japan-Islamic Society due to his experience in dealing with Mongolia and Muslims.

Even prior to the establishment of the state of Manchukuo after the Manchurian Incident and the development of a Greater Asianist policy, Turanism and Japan's Muslim policy had begun to have an impact on Manchuria and Mongolia. This was subsequently given institutional expression through the establishment of the Greater Asia Association.

The Manchurian Incident and the Birth of a Greater Asianist Ideology

Stationed as 11th Division Commander at Zentsuji in Kagawa Prefecture at the time of the Manchurian Incident, Matsui Iwane was apparently critical to Greater Asianist from the very beginning. However, from February 1932 Matsui was in Geneva as Representative of the Army at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, and his attitude underwent a profound shift upon seeing how the Manchurian Incident was dealt with at the League. The Chinese representative Yan Huiqing (顏惠慶) charged his Japanese counterpart with the illegality of the Manchurian Incident, and in front of the assembled Western delegates the two held an angry exchange. At the February 1932 League of Nations Council Meeting, Yan Huiqing asserted that Manchuria was exclusively a part of China, criticized Japan for invading and bringing instability to China at a time when Britain and other nations supported China's strengthening and unification, and appealed to the member nations of the League for their support.¹⁴ Matsui saw this as fellow Asians

14 外務省編纂, 〈國際連盟理事會に於ける顏中国代表演説〉, 《日本外交年表

engaging in an unseemly squabble at the Western-dominated League. Matsui understood the League as an organization whose claim to universalism was a masquerade that hid the self-interest of the Western powers, which would use the Manchurian Incident as an opportunity to interfere in what was an Asian issue between Japan and China. Matsui thought that if the League was only moved by the concerns of the British and French empires, and outside the League were the American and Soviet communist blocs, the only solution for Asian countries was to set up their own federation and resolve their problems within it. Convinced that the Disarmament Conference, like the League as a whole, hid Western self-interests Matsui resigned his commission and returned to Japan in disgust. He emphasised that the League had been set up by white Westerners to fit their own system, one that hung on Asian values and customs like an ill-fitting dinner jacket. In order to free the billion Asians under colonial subjugation, and to return them their independence that had been stolen by the West, it would be necessary to unite the newly-created Manchukuo and China through a movement of Asian renewal. The Manchurian Incident occasioned a deepening of Matsui's engagement with the Asianism of his superiors like Utsunomiya Taro and the Arao Sei, whom he greatly respected. Matsui's logic for moving from criticism of the Manchurian Incident to recognizing the puppet state of Manchukuo as the stage upon which Greater Asianism would develop can be seen as contradictory, but from the standpoint of an anti-Western Asianism such an about-face does not seem particularly strange. Matsui thought that an Asianist movement was

註主要文書 1840-1945) 下, (東京: 原書房, 1965-1966), 頁 202-204. ["The Speeches of China Representative Yan Huiqing at the Council Meeting of the League of Nations," in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy and Important Documents*, Vol. 2].

needed and he resigned his army commission to return to Japan, but was not punished for this.

Upon his return, Matsui joined the Pan-Asian Research Society (汎アジア学会) that counted amongst its members the head of Heibonsha Publishing Shimonaka Yasaburo (下中弥三郎), Professors Mitsukawa Kametaro (満川龜太郎) and Nakatani Takeyo (中谷武世), the Indian Revolutionary Rash Behari Bose and Vietnamese activist Cuong De (Minami Kazuo [南一雄] in Japan). Matsui succeeded in developing this academic research group into an national activist one. On 1 March 1933, the first anniversary of the birth of Manchukuo, the Pan-Asian Research Society joined with army officers like Matsui Iwane, navy officers like Suetsugu Nobumasa (末次信正), academics such as Murakawa Kengo (村川堅固), Yano Jin-ichi (矢野仁一), Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (平泉澄), and politicians and diplomats including Kikuchi Takeo (菊池武夫), Konoe Fumimaro, and Hirota Koki (広田弘毅) to create the Greater Asia Association. The aim was to establish an Asian Federation to match those of Europe, America, the Soviets, and the British Empire, rather than a toothless League of Nations. While theoretically the Greater Asia Association was a cultural rather than political group, in reality it aimed for the propagation of Greater Asianism as an ideology, which would underpin the political and economic activities of its network of members led by Matsui. In August 1935, he resigned from the army, citing factional opposition, and in December he acceded to the chairmanship of the Greater Asia Association.

With the founding of Manchukuo, the influence of the "northern advance" party that advocated preparations for war with the Soviet Union dissipated slightly, and with Greater Asianist support, Japan's focus shifted to the south. Even after Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition to capture Beijing had succeeded, the strength of the New Guangxi clique around the

Guomindang elder Hu Hanmin (胡漢民) which opposed Chiang remained intact. The Greater Asia Association's strategy was forge links with the new Guangxi clique (新桂系) to keep north, central, and southern China divided, to use Taiwan as a base to advance into Southeast Asian, and to oppose Western power through an Asian Federation centered on a Japan-Manchukuo-China alliance. For this to work, however, an improvement in relations with China was essential. Matsui and others thought that through the southern advance a solution could be found for the extremely knotty problem of Manchukuo. That is, by redirecting overseas Chinese capital and Chinese industrial labor towards the West's colonies in South and Southeast Asia, the promise of economic development and prosperity would serve to place the Manchurian issue on the backburner. This scenario can be thought of from the Chinese viewpoint as having had an entirely self-centered logic. In fact, the New Guangxi clique was only interested in using rosy language to draw Japan's economic and political support, and it never provided real cooperation for an attack on Chiang Kai-shek as the Japanese had hoped. But, with Manchuria as the frontier birthplace of the Qing that Sun Yat-sen's nationalist revolution had overthrown, Matsui and his cohort may have thought that integrating the region into a new dynamic economic bloc with the Japanese colonial outposts of Taiwan and Korea would trump Chiang Kai-shek's nation-state framework.

Within this context, and as a direct result of the Great Depression and Manchurian Incident, Japan set up a large economic bloc centered upon the Sea of Japan and including Southeast Asia, South Asia, and even Africa.¹⁵

15 For example, see 堀和生, 《東アジア資本主義史論 I 形成・構造・展開》(京都: ミネルヴァ書房, 2009) [Hori Kazuo, *East Asian Capitalism upon History I: Formation, Structure and Development*].

At the end of 1931, Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo (高橋是清) decided that Japan would come off the gold standard, and utilizing the subsequent devaluation of the yen as a weapon, proceeded to engage in export dumping focused particularly on the British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia. This both strengthened Japanese links with these regions and greatly increased trade friction with the British and Dutch. With Manchuria having been economically severed from the rest of the Chinese mainland after the Manchurian Incident, the need for a market for soybeans and a supply of essential goods led to Manchuria's economy being reconfigured from within the Japanese Empire. From Taiwan, Manchuria received sugar, tea, rice, fruits and vegetables, while soybeans and bean cake fertilizer went the other way. Manchuria exported kaoliang (sorghum), millet, soybeans, flora and fauna, minerals and gold to Korea, with light industrial goods going from Korea to Taiwan. Ammonium sulphate used to make chemical fertilizers flowed from both Manchuria and Korea to Taiwan, while machinery and industrial goods necessary for development flowed from Japan to the three colonies. In order to expand and integrate intra-imperial economic activity with Japan at its apex, sophisticated patterns of supply and industrial specialization were adopted. This allowed the Japanese Empire to be the first region to emerge from the depths of the Great Depression, with Taiwan in particular enjoying an extended boom. With the movement of goods came a greatly increased movement of people. For the industrialization of Manchuria and North Korea, vast numbers of Koreans from the south migrated to these regions. This flow of Korean labor was forcibly redirected to Japan itself in response to the labor shortage that accompanied war with China after 1937. The expansion and integration of economic activities greatly increased nationalism in the higher reaches of the colonial offices,

which further promoted the dissemination of Greater Asianist ideology, including the idea that the Japanese Empire was categorically different from exploitative Western Imperialism.

Matsui Iwane as Commander of the Taiwan Army

In August 1933, not even half a year after the founding of the Greater Asia Association, Matsui was made Commander of the Army on Taiwan. As well as seeking to spread Greater Asianism, he also sought to use the traditionally close links that Taiwan had with the coastal provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi to extricate them from Chiang Kai-shek's program of national unification. Other key members of the Greater Asia Association, such as Wachi Takaji, military attache to the Guangdong consulate, and Taketo Mineji (竹藤峰治), director of the Hua Nan Bank (華南銀行), sought to co-opt Taiwanese and overseas Chinese for this purpose. The Hua Nan Bank had been founded by the Bank of Taiwan, and its management included Taiwanese and Chinese from Southeast Asia and south China. Matsui and his supporters sought ultimately to separate Manchuria, Mongolia, north China, the Southwest, Vietnam, Xinjiang and Tibet from China and link these with territories with Southeast Asia under Japanese leadership, expelling the British and other Western empires and enabling the dream of Asia for the Asians to become reality. Sato Tasuku (佐藤佐), Taiwanese Greater Asia Association member and teacher at the Taipei Commercial High School, advanced the cause of Greater Asianism in Fujian and the Philippines under Matsui's influence. His activities became conspicuous with the restructuring of East Asian trade links that began after the Manchurian Incident, which

involved utilizing the trade networks of Taiwanese and those overseas Chinese not boycotting Japan to expand Japanese-controlled commerce.

I would like here to touch on the activities affecting Fujian, across the Strait from Taiwan. In November 1933, the People's Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Republic (中華民國人民革命政府) was established in Fujian on an anti-Chiang, anti-Japanese platform, and began cooperating with the Communist Party, while Wachi and Matsui called for plans for the Taiwan Army to move against Chiang. Within the Taiwan Army, leaders hoped to promote an agreement between the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government and the New Guangxi faction in the Nationalist army, and unite with them under the banner of Greater Asianism to create an anti-Chiang force. To accomplish this, influential Taiwanese merchants and the Hua Nan Bank's Taketo Mineji with the cooperation of the Taiwanese colonial government, would sell Taiwanese sugar in Guangdong and use part of the profits to fund arms purchases for the Guangxi clique's anti-Chiang forces and also provide financial support to the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government. Greater Asianism had been made famous by Sun Yat-sen's 1924 lecture at the Number One Kobe Girls High School on the subject. In it, he praised the role of Japan, which through its revision of the unequal treaties with the West and victory in the Russo-Japanese War had served to awaken Asians to their subjugation by the Western peoples. Sun further explained that in contrast to the Tyrannical Way (霸道) that lay at the heart of Western culture, the Kingly Way (王道) in Asian culture was superior, and he appealed to Japan to follow the Kingly Way of the East and not the Tyranny of the West. Sun Yat-sen's speech was a criticism of the Versailles-Washington system established by Britain and America and a call for Japan to join an Alliance of Oppressed Nations, the center of which would be

occupied by the three nations of China, Germany, and the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Moreover, as indicated by Sun Yat-sen's reference to Nepal's deference to China, this speech also idealized the Sino-centric tributary system as the Kingly Way of the Orient.¹⁷ Sun Yat-sen's Greater Asianism, along with his Three Principles of the People, lay at the heart of the Guomindang's ideology and continued to be influential after Sun's death in 1925. It was Matsui who reinterpreted Sun Yat-sen's thought to fit the rubric of Greater Asianism and to support an Asian ethnicism led by Japan, and he mined it for slogans to encourage cooperation from China. In September 1935, a branch of the Greater Asia Association was founded in Fujian. But the Japanese Foreign Ministry was critical of Matsui's Taiwan Command in its efforts to use the anti-Chiang forces in Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi to promote the Greater Asianist dream of independence for the New Guangxi clique.

Soon, though, the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government fell in January 1934 after losing the support of the Communist Party, and the province came under the control of Chiang Kai-shek, who bore relations with Japan in mind and placed Chen Yi (陳儀), a graduate of the Japanese Army College and Imperial Japanese Army Academy, in the top post. Between the Fujian provincial authorities and Japan numerous schemes were devised to spur economic development by combining investments from the Bank of

Taiwan and Taiwanese individuals with Japanese technology. There was also an effort at exchanging Fujian's paper, tea, and pottery for Manchurian soybeans and Taiwanese sugar. Another plan, developed with the South Manchurian Railway Company, involved setting up a trading company based in Xiamen (Amoy) which would funnel Manchurian exports to various regions of China and Southeast Asia, and in the process from economic ties between Manchuria, south China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. In the end however attempts to forge links between Taiwan and Fujian, between Manchuria and Fujian with Taiwan as the intermediary, or between region and the rest of the Japanese imperial economic bloc came to the nothing.

In the anti-Chiang provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, the Greater Asia Association tried particularly hard to sponsor a Greater Asianist movement and pinned their hopes on the anti-Chiang New Guangxi clique around the Guomindang elder statesman Hu Hanmin and on the provinces' close links with overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. At the center of these activities was Matsui Iwane's right-hand man, the Guangdong consulate military attache Wachi Takaji, who founded a branch of the Greater Asia Association in Guangdong and worked tirelessly to encourage the development of relations among Guangdong and Guangxi with Taiwan and Manchuria. Matsui and Wachi gifted surplus Japanese rice to the New Guangxi clique and treated the cash gained from sales as loans to Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, but the scheme ended in failure. However, Wachi did sell warplanes, artillery, and machine guns and provided instructors to both provinces.

There was also a plan by Matsui and Wachi through the offices of Hua Nan Bank's Taketō Mineji to provide the Hu Hanmin's New Guangxi clique with a firm financial footing by setting up the Bank of South China and

16 俞辛焯, 《孫文の革命運動と日本》(東京:六興出版, 1989) [Yu Xinchun, *Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Movement and Japan*], 頁 201-225 and 田嶋信雄, 〈東アジア国際関係の中の日独関係 — 外交と戦略〉, 收入工藤章・田嶋信雄編, 《日独関係史 1890-1945: I 総説—東アジアにおける邂逅》(東京:東京大学出版会, 2008) [Tajima Nobuo, "Japanese-German Relations in East Asian International Relations: Diplomacy and Strategy," in Kudo Akira and Tajima Nobuo, eds., *The History of Japanese-German Relations, 1890-1945*], 頁 29-30.

17 松浦正孝, 「「大東亞戦争」はなぜ起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史」 [Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 頁 180.

Taiwan(南支那臺灣銀行). As well as helping to prevent the reunification of China, this bank was to foster Japanese economic influence in southern China, which was being penetrated by British and American capital. Rather than the Bank of Taiwan or the Hua Nan Bank, branches of the Bank of South China and Taiwan would be set up in Guangdong and Guangxi. The investors in this new venture were the Bank of Taiwan, Japanese industries, Japanese companies on Taiwan, wealthy Taiwanese and so forth. Plans were formulated to involve the South Manchurian Railway Company and to export Manchurian soybeans and Taiwanese sugar to Guangdong, again with Guangdong itself keeping the profits as investment capital. There was also another scheme to set up an Industrial Bank to funnel the remittances of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to southern Chinese. At the time, about three hundred million dollars a year were being sent to China through the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, so gaining control of this would both hurt the British and allow the capital of perhaps thirty million overseas Chinese to be put to use in the economic development of southwestern China, increasing its trade with Southeast Asia. These kinds of schemes were said to have been welcomed by Hu Hanmin and Chinese industrialists in Thailand.¹⁸

In this way, China's south would be separated from Chiang Kai-shek's control, and while remaining a republic, would be split into a number of loosely federated units. It would be linked together with Taiwan, and newly independent states like Manchukuo, the Southeast Asian territories, and even

18 For example, see 陳紅民, 〈矛盾の連合体〉、李盈慧, 〈汪精衛政權と重慶國民党によるタイ華僑組織争奪戦〉[松浦正孝編著, 〈昭和・アジア主義の実像〉(京都: ミネルヴァ書房, 2007)] [Matsuura Masataka ed., *The Reality of Asianism in the Showa Era*], 松浦正孝, 〈「大東亞戦争」は何故起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史〉[Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 第6章第3節。

India, all of which would be within an Asian federation. This vision was promoted by the Army Command on Taiwan under Matsui, as well as by his right-hand man Wachi Takaji, and according to Greater Asianist ideology it would connect the economic prosperity of a restructured Japanese imperial economy to its creation within an Asian economic bloc, forming a Co-existent and Co-prosperous region in total contrast to the exploitation of the Western empires. The Greater Asia Association's Nakatani Takeyo, thinking that these manoeuvres involving the New Guangxi clique would succeed, wrote a piece in the August 1935 issue of the magazine *Greater Asianism* which envisaged a new Asian order based on Manchuria for the Manchus, Mongolia for the Mongols, North China for the Northern Chinese, Vietnam for the Vietnamese, Xinjiang for the Uyghurs, Tibet for the Tibetans, with an Asian union founded upon this federation of autonomous states and provinces for every region. Nakatani continued to argue that to reunify the entirety of China as a modern state would be as futile as attempting to recreate the Roman Empire in Europe. Ultimately, most of these plans were not able to be realized because of opposition from Minister of Finance Takahashi and the Foreign Ministry, who feared they would worsen Japan's relations with Britain and Chiang's central government. Additionally, while most of these plans for economic integration failed China undertook currency reform in November 1935 under the guidance of Sir Frederic Leith-Ross, an economic advisor dispatched by Britain. The reform pegged Chinese currency to the pound, linking the Chinese economy more closely with that of the British Empire. Furthermore, Hu Hanmin, who was always anti-Chiang, and occasionally anti-Japanese, and whose existence had kept Chiang in check,

died and by the latter half of 1936, the New Guangxi clique had disintegrated.¹⁹ Japan's schemes involving the clique had failed, and the British position had strengthened.

Still, the movement for federal autonomy in China was, in the minds of the researchers like Mizoguchi Yuzo (溝口雄三), an outgrowth of the provincial authority that had crystallized in the late Ming out of the extension of the concept of native space up to the level of the province. These provinces were autonomous and held each other in check. When the concept of regional autonomy based on provinces entered China from the West towards the end of the Qing, this was conjoined with the concept of a federation and the move towards federal autonomous provinces developed. It was said that Sun Yat-sen also envisaged a federal system until after the 1911 Revolution. The movement for federal autonomous provinces had as its twin pillars a federal parliament and autonomy for every province, and was particularly influential after the May 4th Movement in provinces like Hunan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangdong, and Guangxi in the south and southwest. The movement's efforts to set up a modern state on a federal model after the fall of the Qing led to regional warlord control. The centralized unitary state advocated by Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang confronted the Greater Asianism and federal autonomy espoused by the Greater Asia Association on behalf of the New Guangxi clique. Northern and Central China also saw similar experiments. Even Mao Zedong and the Communist Party had been involved at one time with the Hunan Republican Independence Movement

19 周韋峨、陳紅民、《胡漢民》(廣州:廣東人民出版社,1994)[Zhou Yu-E and Chen Hong-min, *Hu Hanmin*] and 陳紅民、《矛盾的連合体》,松浦正孝編著、《昭和・アジア主義の実像》[Chen Hong-min's chapter in Matsuura Masataka ed., *The Reality of Asianism in the Shōwa Era*], 頁 78-99。

and had once thought of federating the main body of China with the self-governing territories of the Mongols, Tibetans, and the Uyghurs in a Federal Republic of China.²⁰

Matsui Iwane prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War

As Commander of the Army on Taiwan, Matsui Iwane had thrown his energies into spreading Greater Asianism in Taiwan and aiding the separatism of the New Guangxi clique. Leaving this post after a year in August 1934, Matsui emphasised that Taiwan was experiencing unprecedented prosperity due to the benefits of outsourcing its defence costs and the support it received by virtue of its entry into the Japanese Empire. Having returned to Tokyo and joined the Supreme War Council (軍事參議官), a year later in August 1935 he resigned and became a reservist. Now with the freedom of a civilian and as head of the Greater Asia Association able to promote the Greater Asianist movement, Matsui spent October and November of that year in Manchukuo and northern and central China. Looking to spread the Greater Asianist movement, he gained permission for his activities promoting Greater Asianism in Manchukuo from his fellow travelers among the Kwantung Army's officers, and in China he supported creating an independent North China with the slogan of North China for the North Chinese. Returning to Japan, Matsui pronounced that what would be ideal for China would be

20 For example, see 溝口雄三、《辛亥革命の歴史的個性》(《思想》989号, 2006) [Mizoguchi Yuzo, "The Historical Character of the Xinhai Revolution"] and 味岡徹、《南北対立と連省自治運動》[Ajioka Toru, "The North-South Conflict and the Federal Autonomy Movement"] [中央大学人文科学研究所編、《五・四運動史像の再検討》(東京:中央大学出版会, 1986)], Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*, pp. 85-89 for details.

federal autonomy and the division of powers, split into four regions of north, central, south, and southwest China.

From February to March 1936, Matsui traveled in central and southern China to aid his New Guangxi clique scheme, and also met with Chiang Kai-shek, but as already noted the efforts of his Greater Asian movement came to little. At the same time, Matsui had sent the Greater Asia Association director Nakatani Takeyo to northern China to foster the establishment of a branch in Tianjin. Returning from China, Matsui gave talks all over the country to drum up support for Greater Asianism, pushing forward the group's organization in cities like Osaka, Fukuoka, Kanazawa, Kyoto, and Kobe. During this time Matsui was given finance and support not only by the army, but also by the Foreign Minister Hirota Koki, his Deputy Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵), and the Asian Party within the foreign ministry.

Matsui's Strategy for the Sino-Japanese War

With the Marco Polo Bridge incident on the July 1937 signalling the move towards total war, why was the reservist Matsui Iwane mobilized and placed in command of the Shanghai expedition? This essay surmises that Matsui's two closest confidantes in the Greater Asia Association, Nakatani Takeyo, who had promoted the Greater Asianist movement in Tianjin, and the radical Wachi Takaji, who by this time was a staff officer in the China garrison, were in contact with Matsui and wanted him to promote the hardline cause within the army. Within Army Central Command there were several members of the Greater Asia Association who would have perhaps selected Matsui as the foremost China hand. Matsui's plan was to quickly bring down

Chiang's government and realize the spirit of justice and imperial benevolence (正義皇道の精神) while propagating greater Asianism and constructing a new Asian order.²¹ With his experience as General Staff Intelligence Chief and in promoting the Greater Asianist movement, Matsui attached particular importance to intelligence gathering, propaganda activities and covert operations, and sought to now realize the political program of Greater Asianism.

As is well known, the Battle for Shanghai was a desperate fight for the Japanese, due to Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment and the strength of their fortifications, as well as Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Ishihara Kanji's efforts to conserve soldiers and munitions. Subsequently, Ishihara was rebuked by Greater Asia Association members, troop numbers were increased, and Matsui was placed in command of the new Central China Area Army. Taking Shanghai, the general staff had wished to end the war with China quickly so as to prepare for a showdown with the Soviet Union, but they were persuaded by the field army to capture Nanjing and altered their strategy accordingly. With this, as the Ministry of War section chief Tanaka Shinichi (田中新一) noted, the objective of the Sino-Japanese War now became for the Japanese to conquer and rule the Han in the manner of the Yuan and Qing dynasties before them,²² to encourage autonomous rule amongst the different ethnicities, to create a federation of autonomous provinces, and to develop a federated China. The war with China was also an anti-communist war against Soviet support for the Chinese, and became a war

21 松井石根大將戦陣日記 ["The War Diary of General Matsui Iwane"], 南京戦史編集委員会編, 《南京戦史資料集Ⅱ》(偕行社, 1993), 頁5-10。

22 《田中新一支那事変記録 其の三》[Tanaka Shiichi's Sino-Japanese War Diary, Vol.3], 日本防衛省防衛研究所図書館蔵, 1937年10月20日付、21日付。

against British imperialism. As the war intensified, so did its characterization as an Anglo-Japanese struggle that aimed to throw the Western powers like Britain out of Asia. As Matsui went to war, Asian independence activists within the Greater Asia Association such as the exiled Indian Rash Behari Bose formed the Young Asia Union (青年アジア連盟) to develop an anti-British movement within Japan in support of the war with China. The logic of their Greater Asianism was that the future Asian brothers of Japan and China had been forced into war due to Western imperialism which, exemplified by the British, caused conflict between Asian peoples in order to control them. Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, head of the Greater Asia Association in Matsui's absence, hounded Prime Minister Konoe to take a hardline stance in China, including the targeting of Nanjing. From December 1937, Suetsugu was awarded the post of Home Office Minister, from which he pushed Konoe to order the capture of Guangzhou and promoted the anti-British movement. Matsui's command, meanwhile, was propagating Greater Asianism in the areas of China under their control, and, in the style of the federal autonomy movement, sought to set up puppet political authorities for the maintenance of order.

After the fall of Nanjing, as Commander of the Central China Area Army Matsui Iwane had sought to capture Hankou and Guangzhou and break Chiang's control, but he was suddenly dismissed in February 1938. One reason for this was that General Staff Members with connections to the financial world such as Ikeda Shigeaki (池田成彬) had emphasized the importance of ending the war with China quickly because of the parlous state of Japanese finances, and had sought the mediation of Britain as the foreign power with the most authority in China. In these circumstances, the presence of Matsui and his Greater Asianism and their constant critiquer of British aid

to the Chinese was an embarrassment. A second reason was that news of the Nanjing Massacre had spread around the world and become a public relations issue. Matsui was deeply disappointed to be forced to surrender his command, but soon he turned his efforts to realizing his vision through the promotion of the Greater Asianist movement within Japan itself. Upon his return, Matsui was given a hero's welcome and was appointed as an advisor by Prime Minister Konoe to the cabinet. In this new position, he submitted to Konoe statements regarding the Sino-Japanese War.

Matsui believed that blitzkrieg could destroy Chiang's political authority, allowing puppet autonomous governments to be set up in the occupied north and central China which would form a Chinese federated autonomous government together with Mongolian, Tibetan, and Muslim federal autonomous governments, which would be part of a larger Asian federation. In addition to this political vision which grew out of his support for Greater Asianism, Matsui expounded on the need for Western imperialists like the British to be expelled. The Greater Asia Association had promoted the anti-British movement through public events in Japan and it had succeeded in foiling the efforts of Ikeda Shigeaki and Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成), who had sought to use British intervention to bring a halt to the Sino-Japanese War. The massive anti-British protests that erupted throughout Japan in the summer of 1939 when the Japanese Army enforced the Tianjin Blockade showed the strength and success of this drive. With the outbreak of war in Europe, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Tani Masayuki (谷正之) also proposed that autonomous governments should be set up in all regions of China and should be pulled together into a Chinese federal state, with Wang Jingwei installed as Premier in Nanjing. He also affirmed that Western imperial powers like

the British should be chased out of Asia²³ Greater Asianism now had a hold on the central government itself. Others promoting the elevation of Wang, like Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭), were also members of the Greater Asia Association. Despite Wang Jingwei having returned from Hanoi to Shanghai in 1939, co-ordination between the Chinese provisional government in north China and the Chinese Restoration government in Central China took time, and Japan did not recognize Wang's central authority until November 1940. Answering to the Japanese, Wang was supposed to create a central government based on provincial autonomy and promote an anti-British movement but his position was extremely weak and he had no real control over the puppet authorities in north and central China. In order to support him, the Institute for Asian Restoration (興亜院), largely made up of Greater Asia Association members, sought to present Wang as the true inheritor of Sun Yat-sen's Greater Asianism in place of Chiang Kai-shek, to shore up his base in his home region of Guangdong, and to engage the support of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian. The Japanese Army continued to campaign in south China around Guangdong. Chinese in Japan voiced their support for Wang and the new order in East Asia. Propaganda about the righteousness of Japanese policy was broadcast from Taiwan to south China and Southeast Asia in Taiwanese, Mandarin, and English, and Wang himself gave a Cantonese radio broadcast aimed at the local population and overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and America from Guangzhou in August 1939, calling for cooperation with the Japanese.²⁴ While this policy of utilizing Wang amongst

23 松浦正孝, 「大東亜戦争」はなぜ起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史 [Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 頁 314-315.

24 松浦正孝, 「大東亜戦争」はなぜ起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史 [Matsuura, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*], 頁 312-325. 土屋光芳,

the Southeast Asian Chinese was certainly not a complete success, at least in Thailand for a while it worked.²⁵

Furthermore, during the Koiso Kuniaki (小磯國昭) administration that came to power after the collapse of Tojo Hideki's (東條英機) government, Prime Minister Koiso strongly supported the Greater Asianist vision of establishing a Greater Asian Federation made up of a Federal Autonomous China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, a Muslim state, and so forth. Foreign and Greater East Asian Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru also held a vision of China divided and federated. For Japan, the Greater East Asian War was an ideological war for Greater Asianism of the kind promoted by Matsui and the Greater Asia Association.

Conclusion

Using the principles of Asianism and the idea of federal autonomy, Japan set out to control China and ultimately ended up in the Greater East Asian War. But, to reach that point Japan at times had supported Chiang

〈汪精衛政權の《大亞洲主義》とその実現構想〉, 收入松浦正孝編著, 《アジア主義は何を語るのか — 記憶・権力・価値》(京都: ミネルヴァ書房, 2013). On the relationship between the Greater Asianism of Wang Jingwei and his administration's polemicist Zhou Zuoren (周作人) and the Greater Asianism of Japan see Tsuchiya Mitsuyoshi, "The 'Greater Asianism' of the Wang Jingwei Administration and its Plans for Realization" in Matsuura Masataka ed., *What Does Asianism Narrate: Memory, Authority, and Value*.

25 See in 李盈慧, 《抗日與附日 — 華僑・國民政權・汪政權》(臺北: 水牛出版社, 2003) [Li Ying-hui, *Anti-Japanese and Pro-Japanese: Overseas Chinese, the Nationalist Government and the Wang Jingwei Regime*] and 李盈慧, 〈汪精衛政權と重慶国民党によるタイ華僑組織争奪戦〉, 收入松浦正孝編著, 《昭和・アジア主義の実像》[the chapter in Matsuura ed., *The Reality of Asianism in the Showa Era*], 頁 205-235.

Kai-shek's effort to reunify China, and Greater Asianism was largely a minority discourse for much of its existence. Also, when the Meiji Restoration occurred, it was a provincial alliance backed by economic connections that enabled the powerful southwestern provinces like Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen to overthrow the Tokugawa. Since the Meiji Restoration, the mainstream of the Japanese government distanced itself from this kind of Pan-Asianist activity and aimed to build an empire based on the western nation-state, while also restraining pan-Asianist movements. Greater Asianism would only become a powerful force again during the period treated in this essay, during which Japan aimed to fight a Greater East Asian War following the Manchurian Incident. During this period, the forces that advanced the Greater East Asian War used anti-British movements to launch an additional attack on the Japanese establishment, because it had sought to continue political and economic cooperation with Britain, a representative of Western imperialism, based upon an international framework of sovereign nation-states. Matsui and his followers, all old China hands (known as *shina tsu* in Japan), led the invasion of China and provoked the Nanjing Massacre. Their actions were in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, who sought to unify China as a nation-state.

With the modernization of Japan during the Meiji Restoration as a model, promoters of the movement for federal autonomy in China sought to overthrow the Qing and modernize the state. In the end, however, these two movements were never joined within Greater Asianism. The New Guangxi clique only used Japanese Greater Asianism to the extent that it was convenient to do so. Japan was itself an empire which ultimately used principles like provincial federalism, regional government, or Asian federation in an effort to become a type of post-empire capable of confronting the threat

posed by the Chinese, British, and Russian empires.²⁶ But while calling for the independence of Asia's peoples and regions, the result was the invasion and creation of colonial territories throughout the Asia-Pacific.

By analyzing the policies adopted by Matsui and the Greater Asia Association, this essay has clarified the world vision of the agent responsible for advancing the "Greater East Asian War" and the role played by Asianism within it from the vantage point of Japanese history. In so doing, I have shown that Japan's invasion of China was premised upon vision of a new order in Asia centering on Japan and a divided China, and based on a framework of premodern Asian regionalism rather than the framework of the modern nation-state. This is not because I wish to justify their actions. It is because I think that clarifying their strategy, vision, and logic is necessary for understanding history.

26 I lack the space necessary to discuss the attitudes of Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and America towards Japan's brand of Asianism, or the development of anti-British and anti-communist movements in Japan. On these points, please refer to 松浦正孝, 「大東亞戦争」はなぜ起きたのか: 汎アジア主義の政治経済史 [Matsuura Masataka, *Why Did the "Greater East Asian War" Occur?*].

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